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Abstract
The European Semester is an EU procedure, designed to facilitate coordination between national and EU actors in plan‐
ning and implementing economic and fiscal policies and contribute to sustained economic convergence and employ‐
ment in the EU. Scholars have highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU politics for national parliaments since
its introduction in 2011. However, national parliaments participate differently in the European Semester. This article
investigates which factors (institutional, political, economic) are more likely to intensify parliamentary engagement at the
national stage of the procedure, based on a comparative quantitative analysis of parliamentary scrutiny activities across
35 parliaments/chambers in the EU over the 2014–2017 period. The article offers new insights about prospects for greater
parliamentary accountability in the European Semester in practice.
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1. Introduction
The European Semester (ES) is a policy coordination and
monitoring procedure that follows national budgetary
cycles at the EU level. The procedure enables greater
EU level influence over a wide range of member states’
policies with rules and requirements that can constrain
national policy choices (Laffan, 2014; Laffan & Schlosser,
2016). Most notably, it can affect decisions concerning
national budgets, which is the most important preroga‐
tive of national parliaments. In this regard, scholars have
highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU poli‐
tics for national parliaments (de Wilde & Raunio, 2018)
and argued for a stronger parliamentary role and involve‐
ment in the ES to secure accountability and input legiti‐
macy to the ES‐related policy‐making processes (Crum &
Merlo, 2020; Lord, 2017). Yet what national parliaments
actually do in the procedure is still unclear. This contri‐
bution to the thematic issue investigates which institu‐
tional, political and economic factors are more likely to
intensify parliamentary scrutiny of their government’s
programmes in the ES and thus contribute to domes‐
tic accountability.
The ES can create difficulties for parliamentary par‐
ticipation and challenge its abilities in monitoring the
government’s EU‐level actions and obligations concern‐
ing fiscal and economic policies in several aspects.
This relates to the ES ‘hybrid’ mode of governance
(Armstrong, 2013; Dawson, 2015) that diverts from stan‐
dard EU decision‐making and legislative procedures, the
fact that there are no specific EU provisions for the for‐
mal involvement of national parliaments (Amtenbrink
& Repasi, 2016), and the functioning of the procedure
as an ongoing cycle with intensive exchanges between
the European and national authorities in yearly revi‐
sions of national policy plans and EU recommendations
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(Crum & Curtin, 2015; Dawson, 2015). As a result, the
ES does not only add another layer of complexity to
EU‐level policy‐making but it also requires significant
efforts from national parliaments to effectively follow
the procedure and respond to its constraining aspects
over national policy choices that might stretch their
capacities and motivation.
Empirical studies so far have pointed to uneven par‐
ticipation of national parliaments and highlighted the
importance of both formal powers and motivation in
influencing parliamentary decisions to scrutinise the ES.
Rasmussen (2018) stressed the importance of formal
powers and monitoring capabilities for effective parlia‐
mentary involvement in the ES. Still, Kreilinger (2018)
argued that active parliamentary ES scrutiny depends
on domestic political dynamics and economic strength,
while formal powers are a precondition for greater
scrutiny. The study by van den Brink (2018) pointed
out that parliaments are rather selective when consid‐
ering more active ES scrutiny, depending on the percep‐
tions of the policy impact this might have in the proce‐
dure. Maatsch (2017) showed that contestation of the
ES is more likely to occur when parliament has strong
budgetary powers and there is incongruence between
EU recommendations and parliamentary party economic
preferences. Overall, the empirical evidence is scarce
and because the existing assessments focused on par‐
liamentary participation in different ES cycles and exam‐
ined the impact of different factors at different stages of
the procedure, findings are not always directly compara‐
ble and a general overview is still lacking.
Against this background, this article contributes with
a comparative analysis of the ES scrutiny activities
across 35 parliamentary chambers in the EU over the
2014–2017 period. The analysis does not include the
Greek parliament (Greece did not fully participate in
the ES during the observed period), and parliaments
from Malta and Cyprus (lack of data for operational‐
isation of variables for the analysis). In addition, the
upper chambers in Austria and Belgium (no formal com‐
petencies) and Slovenia (specific composition compli‐
cates operationalisation of variables for the analyses) are
not included.
The contribution of the article is threefold. First,
methodologically, it provides an operationalisation of
the parliamentary scrutiny in the ES that allows for a
distinction between passive/minimal and active/greater
participation in the procedure. Second, empirically,
it offers a comparative analysis of parliamentary ES
scrutiny activities and makes it possible to test the
explanatory power of factors commonly argued in the
literature to be influencing parliamentary participation
in EU policy‐making on a larger number of observa‐
tions and over a longer period. The aim is to pro‐
vide a general overview of parliamentary engagement
in ES scrutiny in practice and thus contribute to still
scarce empirical research on parliamentary behaviour
in the EU economic governance. Finally, the article con‐
tributes to the broader debate about the parliamentary
accountability and democratic legitimacy of the EU eco‐
nomic governance.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.
Section 2 discusses how the parliamentary scrutiny in
the ES can be operationalised quantitatively and also
includes elements for greater accountability. Drawing on
previous research, the third section outlines theoretical
expectations. Data and operationalisation are presented
in the fourth section, followed by the empirical analysis
in the fifth section. The final section concludes.
2. Measuring Parliamentary Scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP
This article focuses on parliamentary engagement at
the national stage of the ES when national govern‐
ments are required to report on their plans for achieving
defined budgetary objectives (Stability or Convergence
Programme [S/CP]) and actions related to broader socio‐
economic policies (National Reform Programme [NRP])
and how they will contribute to achieving EU priori‐
ties and targets. These programmes have to be submit‐
ted to the Commission for review by the end of April
each year. Based on the assessment of the S/CP‐NRP,
the Commission prepares policy recommendations that
are expected to be implemented by the member states.
An adequate parliamentary involvement in the prepara‐
tion process of the S/CP‐NRP is necessary to ensure that
government’s planned policy actions, and its EU commit‐
ments and their implications, are properly assessed, dis‐
cussed and justified, i.e., that the government is account‐
able for its ES decisions.
In the context of this thematic issue, accountabil‐
ity is defined as a chain of exchanges between accoun‐
tor (here the members of parliament) and accountee
(here members of government), whereby the former
asks questions about policies and actions of the latter,
while the latter must provide answers (Wozniakowski
et al., 2021). To be able to systematically assess par‐
liamentary accountability mechanisms at the national
stage of the ES across different parliaments in practice,
this study relies on the existing literature measuring par‐
liamentary scrutiny in EU affairs for selection of elements
and indicators (Auel et al., 2015a; Karlas, 2011; Maurer
& Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2012; for an
overview see also Auel & Neuhold, 2018). These are
adjusted to the ES context and used to develop scrutiny
activity scores (see Table 1). I will briefly discuss selected
elements and how they contribute to enhancing parlia‐
mentary scrutiny and control over the government in
the ES.
The number of committee meetings and/or ple‐
nary debates can already indicate the intensity of
scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP and allows for an initial
distinction between passive and active parliamentary
engagement (the first element). Since all ES‐related
documents are eventually available online, including
the S/CP‐NRP, it is important that parliaments obtain
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Table 1. Indicators measuring parliamentary scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP.
Elements Measurement
Intensity Number of committee meetings
Number of plenaries
Access to additional information Number of hearings with:
— Representatives from the Government
— EU officials
— Experts/Stakeholders
Outcome Number of parliamentary statements on the programmes
Number of parliamentary votes on the programmes
Mainstreaming the ES Number of committees involved in the scrutiny
Plenary debate, counted as a maximum number of committees involved
Timing Number of days passed since the first scrutiny activity took place before the S/CP‐NRP
were sent to the Commission (April 30)
Note: Suggested indicators and measurements are based on the literature cited directly above.
additional information on these programmes and their
implications. This can be done via parliamentary hear‐
ings (the second element). In particular, hearings with
the government allow for a targeted discussion about
the government’s planned activities and additional expla‐
nations, while hearings with EU representatives and rel‐
evant experts can provide a source of independent infor‐
mation and additional expert assessments. This can help
parliaments to examine government plans more effec‐
tively, and ensure greater accountability. The third ele‐
ment relates to parliamentary resolutions or voting on
the S/CP‐NRP (all contributions on which I rely for selec‐
tion of elements emphasise and include this aspect for
EU affairs more generally).
Parliaments that employ these instruments can bet‐
ter articulate their position concerning the government’s
plans and EU level commitments in the S/CP‐NRP and
highlight potential disagreements and their preferred
course of action. This, in turn, can increase the govern‐
ment’s anticipation of parliamentary reaction and incen‐
tivise greater discussions to provide pertinent explana‐
tions, thus ensuring greater accountability (here, see
also Rozenberg, 2017). Furthermore, since the ES is an
intensive and technical procedure that covers exten‐
sive policy areas, the way parliaments process ES issues,
i.e., the mainstreaming is important (the fourth ele‐
ment). For example, the literature emphasises the ben‐
efits of relying on sectoral expertise in ensuring effective
scrutiny (here, see alsoGattermann et al., 2016). Sectoral
committees can provide specialised assessments of dif‐
ferent policy areas covered in the S/CP‐NRP and con‐
tribute to expert discussion and efficient scrutiny per‐
formance. Scrutiny of these programmes in plenary can
ensure broader political discussion on relevant ES issues
and their implications. Both aspects can enhance par‐
liamentary accountability. Finally, the timing of parlia‐
mentary involvement (the fifth element) is important
because effective scrutiny requires sufficient time for the
review of the S/CP‐NRP. Since the ES operates according
to specified deadlines, it is relevant to consider not just
when parliaments receive relevant documents but also
when the scrutiny process actually starts.
3. Explaining the Variation
To explain the variation in the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny across
parliaments/chambers, I test the explanatory power of
three sets of factors that have been found in the liter‐
ature to play a role in observed differences of parlia‐
mentary participation in EUpolicy‐making. These include
the national institutional context (H1a, H1b) and political
(H2, H3a, H3b) and economic (H4) incentives.
The literature highlighted the importance of the insti‐
tutional context for the overall parliamentary activity
since it determines formal rules and provides institu‐
tional opportunities (Auel et al., 2015b; Raunio, 2011).
Because the ES is an EU level exercise that is particu‐
larly focused on national public finances, parliamentary
strength in both EU and budgetary matters is impor‐
tant for engagement of national parliaments in this exer‐
cise and parliamentary ability to effectively scrutinise
the S/CP‐NRP and (if necessary) constrain government
actions as well as EU level commitments. Powerful parlia‐
ments in EU and budgetary matters can obtain relevant
information more easily and are in a better position to
secure timely and substantial scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP.
H1a: The greater the parliamentary strength in EU
affairs, the greater S/CP‐NRP scrutiny
H1b: The greater the parliamentary strength in bud‐
getary matters, the greater S/CP‐NRP scrutiny
However, a strong parliamentary position and formal
opportunities to hold the government accountable do
not necessarily translate into de facto activity (Auel
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et al., 2015a). The extent to which parliaments make
use of available formal means to monitor the govern‐
ment will vary depending on executive‐legislative rela‐
tions (Raunio, 2011). Moving beyond a view of parlia‐
ment as a collective actor, different parliamentary actors
will have different interests when it comes tomore inten‐
sive scrutiny of the government’s policies and actions,
and they are expected to employ different strategies
(Auel, 2007; Raunio, 2011). The interest of the parliamen‐
tary opposition is to criticise the government’s planned
or implemented policies and/or propose alternative solu‐
tions (Karlsson & Peterson, 2018), so it will bemore likely
to demand greater political accountability from the gov‐
ernment (Auel, 2007) in the ES (Kreilinger, 2018). By con‐
trast, the governing parliamentary majority is expected
to be less motivated to thoroughly scrutinise the govern‐
ment’s ES agenda (Kreilinger, 2018) and more prone to
support the government in respecting EU commitments
and agreements (Rose, 2014). Therefore, the greater the
seat share the governing parties hold in the parliament
and the greater themargin over the opposition, themore
the government can rely on its parliamentary support to
push forward its ES agenda.
H2: The greater the seat share of the governing par‐
ties in parliament, the lower S/CP‐NRP scrutiny
Divergent intra‐parliamentary political stances on respec‐
tive policy areas and issues can also incentivise greater
scrutiny (Gattermann & Hefftler, 2015). The ES enables
enhanced EU surveillance of key national policies
whereby the Commission assesses national fiscal and
economic plans and can recommend financial sanc‐
tions. Such strong EU‐level presence in national mat‐
ters coupled with the enhanced EU rules and monitoring
mechanisms can especially incentivise Eurosceptic par‐
liamentary parties to challenge the ES agenda for their
electoral and policy advantages. Particularly so since for‐
merly depoliticised issues related to EU economic gover‐
nance have become increasingly salient (Leupold, 2016).
Based on previous research (Gattermann & Hefftler,
2015; Raunio, 2005), such potential of political contes‐
tation of the EU in parliament is expected to positively
correlate with tighter scrutiny.
H3a: The higher the conflict potential over the EU in
parliament, the greater S/CP‐NRP scrutiny
The ES touches upon politically salient issues of national
economic and social development. For quite some time,
the ES was oriented more towards fiscal consolidation
(Falkner, 2016; Zeitlin, 2016). In terms of general eco‐
nomic policy preferences, this approach is more likely
to be supported by economically right‐leaning parties,
with economically right‐wing governments being better
placed to implement such policies (Alesina et al., 1997;
Eihmanis, 2018). By contrast, since economically left‐
leaning parties generally prefer more generous social
policies (Alesina et al., 1997), there might be a wider
gap between the ES policy approach and the preferences
of these parties. Additionally, EU fiscal rules might be
especially constraining for the preferred policy choices
of the parties representing the economic left. Since the
parliamentary politicisation of EU economic governance
evolved around national economic interests (Maatsch,
2017; Wonka, 2016), a greater potential for disagree‐
ment along ideological left‐right economic lines in parlia‐
ment is expected to incentivise scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP
to secure preferred policy outcomes.
H3b: The higher the conflict potential on the eco‐
nomic issues in parliament, the greater S/CP‐NRP
scrutiny
Finally, previous research showed that the national eco‐
nomic situation has had a positive impact on parliamen‐
tary scrutiny during the Eurozone crisis (Auel & Höing,
2015), and even in the period after the crisis (Kreilinger,
2018). Since member states across the EU strive to main‐
tain a positive economic outlook and restore and/or
secure their credibility on the financial markets and the
confidence of foreign investors, unfavourable economic
situations and their potential economic and political con‐
sequences are expected to attract parliamentary atten‐
tion. Importantly, problematic budgetary and macroeco‐
nomic developments detected within the ES can lead to
the opening of procedures for excessive deficits and/or
macroeconomic imbalances, accompanied by stricter EU
surveillance, which is expected to incentivise greater
parliamentary scrutiny of the government’s plans and
actions in the ES.
H4: Themore unfavourable the national economic sit‐
uation, the greater S/CP‐NRP scrutiny
4. Data and Operationalisation
4.1. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a score for the parliamen‐
tary scrutiny activities related to the S/CP‐NRP, calcu‐
lated for each parliament/chamber and each year under
the investigation (see Figure 1). The score is based on
five elements and consists of ten indicators that were
presented and discussed in section two of this arti‐
cle. Data on the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny activities was col‐
lected in an original quantitative dataset, using vari‐
ous sources (the ES documents, parliamentary websites
and the IPEX database). Additional data and materi‐
als were directly obtained from parliamentary officials,
which also verified all collected data for their respective
parliament/chamber (with few exceptions, including the
Belgian, the Bulgarian and the Swedish parliament as
well as the Romanian Senate and the Slovenian National
Assembly). The dataset includes a total of 309 parlia‐
mentary scrutiny activities. The final sample consists of
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Figure 1. Parliamentary S/CP‐NRP scrutiny scores. Notes: The figure shows overall scrutiny activity in a specific year in
comparison to the most engaged parliaments/chambers; Portugal did not fully participate in the ES in 2014; ‘L’ stands for
lower and ‘U’ for upper chamber for bicameral parliaments.
140 chamber‐year observations. A detailed overview of
yearly scores and explanations of employed methods of
aggregation and weighting is provided in Table A1 in the
Supplementary File.
4.2. Independent Variables
Table 2 presents the main independent variables that
test the formulated hypotheses. All variables are mea‐
sured at the chamber level, with exception of the
economic situation, Eurozone membership and public
Euroscepticism, which aremeasured at the country level.
Variables measuring the seat share of governing parties
in parliament, and the conflict potential over EU and
economic issues in parliament are re‐calculated after
each parliamentary election to account for the changes.
The variable measuring public Euroscepticism and the
economic situation is calculated yearly. Table A2 in the
Supplementary File provides summary statistics for all
variables used in the analyses.
5. Empirical Analysis
To account for the multilevel hierarchical structure and
the longitudinal aspect of the data, I employ multi‐level
modelling. The data on scrutiny activities of 35 parlia‐
ments/chambers (level‐1) is nested within 25 countries
(level‐2). Statistical evidence obtained by the inter‐class
correlation coefficient (ICC) demonstrated hierarchical
structure effects on the outcome variable: 53 percent of
the total variation is due to differences between coun‐
tries. The follow‐up likelihood ratio tests confirmed that
the multi‐level model is preferred over a classical, single‐
level model. Temporal effects were not confirmed by the
performed initial tests, and are, therefore, not included
in further analyses and model specifications.
I conducted a series of fixed slope, random intercept
multi‐level analyses.Model 1 predicts the outcome using
institutional factors only. Model 2 introduces the polit‐
ical, while Model 3 adds the economic factors. Finally,
Model 4 is a full model that includes all three sets of fac‐
tors and control variables. Predictor variables in the anal‐
ysis are not centred, considering the small sample size
and limited year intervals as well as the fact that there is
no collinearity issue detected.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the multi‐
level analyses for the parliamentary scrutiny of the
S/CP‐NRP as the outcome variable (for all robustness
tests see the Supplementary File). Different model spec‐
ifications yielded similar results. The results confirm the
effect of the formal powers in EU affairs at the 99 per‐
cent level. The effect is also considerable: Increasing
the OPAL score (range: 0.21–0.84) by 0.1 results in an
increase of 0.06 in the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny score (range:
0–0.61), which amounts to a yearly scrutiny score of
some parliaments. The effect of the debt level is also
confirmed with a statistical significance at the 99 per‐
cent level: Higher government debt‐to‐GDP level is asso‐
ciated with higher scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP. For every
unit increase in the government debt level, a 0.002
unit increase in the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny score is predicted.
Considering that the levels of government debt range
from 9.5 to 132.6, this effect is not as small as the
small coefficient in the analysis suggests. Furthermore,
the results indicate a negative effect of the greater seat
share of the governing parties in the parliament on the
scrutiny of S/CP‐NRP, as expected. Yet this finding is not
robust under different model specifications and cannot
be reported with confidence.
By contrast, the effect of the budget amendment
powers (H1b) is not confirmed: The association with
the outcome variable does not have the expected direc‐
tion and does not conform to conventional levels of
significance. The conflict potential over the EU (H3a),
as well as economic issues (H3b), do not have statis‐
tically observable effects either. Finally, the effects of
control variables point in the expected direction but
are not statistically confirmed. The limited variation in
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Table 2. Independent variables and operationalisation.
Independent variable Operationalisation Source
EU affairs powers (H1a) The OPAL score measuring the institutional parliamentary strength
in EU affairs, updated to include Croatia.
Auel et al. (2015a)
Budget powers (H1b) Measured as legally prescribed arrangements for a parliament to
amend the budget with the following categories: 0 = no
amendments allowed; 0.5 = amendments allowed with certain
limitations; 1 = unconstrained amendments.
OECD (n.d.)
The seat share of governing
parties in the parliament
(H2)
The ‘total government support’ variable in the CPDS dataset
measuring parliamentary seat share of all parties in the
government, weighted by the numbers of days in office in any
given year. The variable allows accounting for all changes in the




Conflict potential: EU (H3a) Calculated based on the formula for the weighted parliamentary
party system dispersion provided by Gattermann and Hefftler
(2015, p. 134), using data on party positions on the European
integration from the 2014 and 2017 rounds of the CHES
expert survey.
Polk et al. (2017)
Conflict potential:
economic issues (H3b)
Calculated based on the formula for the weighted parliamentary
party system dispersion provided by Gattermann and Hefftler
(2015, p. 134), using data on party ideological stances on economic
issues from the 2014 and 2017 rounds of the CHES expert survey.
Polk et al. (2017)
Economic situation (H4) Measured as the gross general government debt as a percentage
of GDP.
Eurostat (2021)
Elections (control variable) Binary variable with value 1 when parliamentary elections took
place two months before the 30 April deadline for the submission
of national programmes. The organisation of the parliamentary
elections close to this deadline is expected to negatively affect
scrutiny activity due to campaigning, and the dissolution of the





Binary variable with value 1 for formal membership in the
Eurozone. The expectation is that the Eurozone parliaments will
have more incentives for greater scrutiny since there are more EU
requirements and also the possibility of sanctions within the ES for
the Eurozone member states.
Public Euroscepticism
(control variable)
Measured as the percentage of citizens per year stating that their
country did not benefit from EU membership, relying on the
European Parliament 2014–2017 Parlemeter surveys as a data
source. The expectation is that parliamentarians in more
Eurosceptic member states will have more incentives to actively
participate in the ES for their electoral purposes.
European
Parliament (n.d.)
data could be the reason for the statistically insignifi‐
cant negative effect of parliamentary elections since only
6 chambers had elections shortly before the 30 April
deadline. Eurozone membership shows a positive effect
on scrutiny but it is not statistically significant, suggest‐
ing that the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny is not more important for
Eurozone parliaments (see also Auel & Höing, 2015). Still,
additional tests which model some individual dimen‐
sions of the overall S/CP‐NRP scrutiny score separately,
suggest that Eurozone parliaments aremore likely to rely
on the specialised expertise within the parliament by
including more sectoral committees in the scrutiny pro‐
cess (see Table A5 in the Supplementary File). Finally, the
effect of public Euroscepticism on parliamentary scrutiny
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Table 3.Multilevel models for the parliamentary scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP.
DV: Scrutiny score SCP/NRP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EU affairs powers 0.528*** 0.569*** 0.660*** 0.613***
(0.149) (0.157) (0.136) (0.133)
Budget amendment powers −0.0395 −0.0470 −0.0621 −0.0543
(0.0464) (0.0469) (0.0428) (0.0426)
Seat share govt parties −0.00232 −0.00281* −0.00283*
(0.00137) (0.00130) (0.00130)
EU conflict −0.00227 −0.000991 0.0000152
(0.00374) (0.00339) (0.00338)
Economic conflict 0.00214 0.00173 0.000900
(0.00318) (0.00285) (0.00290)








Constant −0.0595 0.0374 −0.152 −0.137
(0.0770) (0.133) (0.127) (0.126)
lns1_1_1
Constant −2.241*** −2.207*** −2.482*** −2.549***
(0.177) (0.184) (0.213) (0.237)
lnsig_e
Constant −2.277*** −2.299*** −2.312*** −2.307***
(0.0667) (0.0676) (0.0684) (0.0698)
Observations 140 140 140 140
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; standard errors in parentheses.
points in a negative direction but it is not statistically
confirmed, suggesting thatmore sceptical public opinion
towards the EU does not necessarily create incentives
for parliamentarians to actively engage in the ES. There
are, however, some indications that more sceptical pub‐
lic opinion towards the EU might hurt the timing of par‐
liamentary scrutiny, disincentivising an earlier start of
scrutiny activities related to the S/CP‐NRP (see Table A5
in the Supplementary File).
To summarise, the statistical evidence selectively
confirms the importance of institutional factors in
explaining parliamentary S/CP‐NRP scrutiny. All variants
of the model provide empirical support for the expec‐
tation that formal strength in EU affairs is an impor‐
tant predictor for greater scrutiny (H1a). The scores
show, for example, active engagement of the Finnish
parliament, the Czech upper chamber and the German
lower chamber in the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny, which are
considered among the most powerful parliaments in
EU affairs (see Auel et al., 2015a). The Swedish and
Estonian parliaments are some noticeable exceptions in
this regard. Surprisingly, and contrary to the expecta‐
tion (H1b), the budget‐amending powers do not seem
to increase the likelihood of greater scrutiny. One possi‐
ble interpretation could be that parliaments with strong
budgetary powers already have institutional opportuni‐
ties to actively engage and influence the government’s
public finance policies and scrutinise EU‐related fiscal
obligations within the national budgetary process, and
therefore, invest fewer efforts in the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny.
In other words, parliaments with a stronger budgetary
position may not have to rely on the ES scrutiny to effec‐
tively hold their government to account and monitor the
implementation of budgetary policies, including compli‐
ance with EU requirements. The S/CP‐NRP then may not
warrant intensive scrutiny. The Finnish parliament is an
outlier because it enjoys unconstrained budget amend‐
ment powers (Wehner, 2006) but also intensively scru‐
tinised national ES programmes. This is because the ES
is well aligned with the existing budgetary timeline in
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Finland (Leino‐Sandberg & Salminen, 2014). The Stability
Programme is part of the government’s Public Finance
Programme and is scrutinised following a regular bud‐
getary process.
Another surprising finding is that there is no strong
statistical evidence of the effect of political‐motivational
incentives on the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny (H2, H3a, H3b).
All tested factors seem to be either unstable or negli‐
gible predictors for greater scrutiny. There is some evi‐
dence that the greater parliamentary seat share of the
governing parties decreases scrutiny activity, but the
effect is unstable. The observation that fundamental
lines of political conflict in parliament are not what is
driving greater scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP could corre‐
spond to findings by Rasmussen (2018) and vandenBrink
(2018), who showed that in some parliaments there is a
lack of political motivation to perform greater scrutiny
when these programmes provide a summary of poli‐
cies that have been discussed and agreed upon within
national processes. Also, some of these programmes
refer to EU priorities/targets rather generally and do not
always specify how the outlined measures will address
them (European Court of Auditors, 2020). Increased
party‐political contestation might, however, occasionally
spur scrutiny in some specific instances in some cases
(Kreilinger, 2018; Maatsch, 2017). Further qualitative
research is needed to uncover whether and how exactly
party‐political factors impact the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny and
whether pro/anti‐EU and economic left/right lines of con‐
flict become visible in parliamentary discussions of these
programmes although they might not need to necessar‐
ily invoke them.
Finally, the statistical evidence confirms the impor‐
tance of the economic incentives (H4) but requires fur‐
ther specification. The results suggest that with the
increase of government debt, parliamentary attempts to
secure their participation in the ES seem to be greater,
and scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP tends to be more active.
The scores show that parliaments whose countries had
high debt levels, such as the French, the Italian and
the Portuguese parliaments, for example, performed
greater scrutiny. Importantly, other economic indicators
that are commonly used to assess the national economic
situation, such as the unemployment rate or national
credit ratings do not seem to affect the parliamentary
S/CP‐NRP scrutiny (for the results of all tested economic
indicators see Tables A3 and A4 in the Supplementary
File). One possible interpretation could be that in the ES,
national parliaments tend to focus on the debt level as
the core economic indicator, considering that its limits
are defined by the Maastricht Treaty and closely mon‐
itored at the EU level within the procedure. Excessive
debt levels can trigger stricter EU surveillance over
national policies within the ES, increasing the pressure
on national governments to take corrective actions effec‐
tively. For Eurozone members, there is also a threat of
sanctions in case of consistent non‐compliance. Other
economic indicators are relevant for overall economic
performance. Yet, possibly because these indicators do
not carry as serious implications for the member state
governments within the ES as the high public debt level,
they do not incentivise greater parliamentary scrutiny.
6. Conclusion
The ES procedure is a central part of the EU economic
governance, aimed at contributing to the financial and
economic stability and sustainability of the Eurozone/EU.
Yet whether it has weakened the role and abilities of
national parliaments to scrutinise/control fiscal and eco‐
nomic policies is still being questioned (Wozniakowski
et al., 2021). This article assessed the participation of
national parliaments in the ES in practice, investigating
which factors help to explain the variation in parliamen‐
tary scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP. The developed scrutiny
activity scores allowed for an assessment from a broad
comparative perspective and during four ES cycles.
Before concluding, two caveats are in order. The first
is related to the effect of budgetary powers on the par‐
liamentary scrutiny activity. I accounted for this aspect
in a limited way since I only considered budget amend‐
ment powers, which usually highly correlate with the
overall budgetary strength (Wehner, 2006) and are an
important factor in explaining cross‐parliamentary vari‐
ation in the budgetary procedure (Wehner, 2014). More
comprehensive indicators exist (Hallerberg et al., 2012;
Wehner, 2006) but they include only lower chambers
and/or do not include all EU member states, and hence,
were not suitable for the analysis. There is a need for
an indicator of the parliamentary budgetary strength
that would cover all parliamentary chambers in the EU.
Including such an indicator in the analysis would provide
firmer results on the effect of parliamentary budgetary
powers on the S/CP‐NRP scrutiny. I found a negative
yet insignificant effect of these powers on the S/CP‐NRP
scrutiny activity but this does not mean that they are
not important for the parliamentary following of the pro‐
cedure overall and especially parliamentary abilities to
effectively process ES‐related budgetary and macroeco‐
nomic requirements.
The second is related to some limitations of the
developed scrutiny activity scores that have to be men‐
tioned. The scores reveal only a specific portion of parlia‐
mentary ES activities. They concern the S/CP‐NRP exclu‐
sively and do not consider other ES documents/stages.
Also, the scores do not include all possible parliamen‐
tary scrutiny activities (for example oral questions).
Moreover, while the scores measure different degrees
of parliamentary scrutiny, they cannot capture actual
parliamentary impact. The parliamentary participation
in the ES involves complex political considerations and
interactions on both national and EU levels, which can‐
not be easily detected or quantified. A more qualita‐
tive approach would be required to assess how success‐
fully parliaments managed to exert their influence in
the ES.
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Despite these limitations, the findings show that the
majority of national parliaments/chambers scrutinised
the S/CP‐NRP, although with considerable variation con‐
cerning their activities. Few parliaments/chambers did
not engage in scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP at all, while
some parliaments performed scrutiny only irregularly.
In explaining cross‐parliamentary variation, the empir‐
ical evidence indicates two important predictors for
greater scrutiny of the S/CP‐NRP: formal strength in EU
affairs and government debt level, as a specific eco‐
nomic incentive.
Formal powers and capacities in EU affairs can facil‐
itate engagement in the ES as an EU level procedure,
and national parliaments tend to use their available
institutional opportunities to scrutinise S/CP‐NRP more
actively. Previous research on parliamentary behaviour
in the ES/EU affairs argued that formal powers in EU
affairs are an important prerequisite for greater scrutiny
activity (Auel &Höing, 2015; Auel et al., 2015b; Kreilinger,
2018; Rasmussen, 2018). In this regard, the lack of
adequate institutional opportunities can constrain effec‐
tive parliamentary scrutiny of the government’s planned
actions concerning EU requirements and targets outlined
in national ES programmes in practice. This highlights the
importance of parliamentary institutional adaptation in
the ES (see Winzen, 2021).
Moreover, it seems that financial stability, which is
central to the ES policy coordination andmonitoring, cap‐
tures parliamentary attention.Whenpublic finance liabil‐
ity (approximatedwith the public debt) is at risk, national
parliaments tend to increase their attempts to scrutinise
the S/CP‐NRP more actively. Exceeding debt level lim‐
its defined by the Maastricht Treaty can trigger stricter
EU surveillance over national policies and increase EU
level pressure on the government to implement mea‐
sures for debt reduction. For Eurozone member states
there is also a threat of financial fines. It appears that
parliaments tend to focus on the binding aspect of the
ES and are aware of potential negative EU implications
for their government, demanding greater accountability
for planned policy actions and measures in case of prob‐
lematic developments.
Overall, the findings of this contribution suggest that
beyond binding ruleswithin the ES,where the EU‐related
aspect and impact on national policies is the most evi‐
dent, parliamentary attention to the procedure and
prospects for greater accountability might be limited.
The largely non‐binding EU policy recommendations,
which are the main output of the ES, and the rather low
national implementation rate (Darvas & Leandro, 2015)
might contribute to the apparent low political salience of
the ES in national parliaments more generally. This could
suggest that, in practice, a clear link between the ES pro‐
cedure that, apart from the binding rules, requires other
commitments in coordinating multiple national policies
at the EU level and national policy‐makingmight bemiss‐
ing. This rather raises concerns from a democratic legit‐
imacy point of view since, even as a soft‐governance
tool, the ES enables EU steering and guiding of member
states’ policies (Haas et al., 2020) and “involves the mak‐
ing of political judgements at the European level” (Crum
& Merlo, 2020, p. 407). In this regard, EU targets and
objectives in the ES concerning broader socio‐economic
development in the EU that can influence national pol‐
icy choices might not be detected and adequately scruti‐
nised and debated by national parliaments, if at all.
The participation of national parliaments in the EU
multilevel system is a broadly discussed topic in the lit‐
erature. The continuous European integration process
not only increasingly affected national competencies
but also often empowered executive actors and created
complex and opaque policy‐ and decision‐making pro‐
cesses, thus raising concerns about the EU democratic
deficit (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). In this regard, the role
of the national parliaments together with the European
Parliament has been emphasised in securing account‐
ability, essential to democratic governance, in the mul‐
tilevel EU system (Crum& Fossum, 2009). Yet integrating
national parliaments in the EU multilevel system proved
difficult (Raunio, 2009). Although enhanced over time,
parliamentary institutional rights (Winzen, 2012, 2021)
and practices (Auel et al., 2015b), including especially
communication efforts (Auel et al., 2016; Auel & Höing,
2015; Wonka, 2016) in EU matters still differ across
national parliaments. The extent to which national par‐
liaments are able and willing to engage in EU affairs
(Auel & Christiansen, 2015) and play a more active role
as an essential part of the democratic structure of the
EU multilevel governance varies. Overall, national par‐
liaments face different trade‐offs and opportunity costs
when considering more active participation in the EU
framework and their approaches to EUmatters are selec‐
tive (de Wilde & Raunio, 2018). The ES connects the EU
governance with core national policies, which are also
domestically highly politically salient. It has been argued
that national parliaments, therefore, should prioritise
this procedure because it can be beneficial for enhanc‐
ing the parliamentary role and democratic functions in
both domestic and EU affairs (de Wilde & Raunio, 2018).
Yet the findings of this contribution suggest that, while
national parliaments tend to be active at the national
stage of the ES in practice, the ESmay still fail to generate
political motivation for greater parliamentary account‐
ability across member states.
The outlined state of affairs, however, might change
in light of the current developments related to the
Covid‐19 pandemic. The management of the new
Recovery and Resilience Facility instrument, providing
EU grants and loans to the member states to support
their reform and investment efforts, is now linked to
the ES (European Commission, 2020). EU financial sup‐
port will depend on the Commission’s assessments of
National Recovery Plans and national progress in reform
implementation. Therefore, not only the government’s
programmes, as well as specific stages of the ES, are
expected to become increasingly politically salient but
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the ES will also be more directly linked with national
policy‐making. This could emphasize the political aspect
of the ES procedure and strengthen the role and involve‐
ment of national parliaments in the EUmultilevel system
of governance.
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